The Plain Error of Cause and Prejudice
Charles Eric Hintz*
When parties fail to raise claims at the proper time, courts often subject
those claims to heightened standards that impose additional hurdles to relief.
One of the most common is “plain error,” which only permits correcting an error
that is obvious, that affects substantial rights, and that seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. In the 1982
decisions of United States v. Frady and Engle v. Isaac, however, the Supreme
Court rejected plain error’s applicability to procedural default in federal habeas
corpus proceedings—i.e., to claims that should have been, but were not, timely
presented at a pre-federal habeas stage. Instead, it applied the rule of “cause
and prejudice,” which allows review only if a petitioner has a valid reason for
a default and can show actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of
federal law.
Recent scholarship has largely ignored Frady and Engle’s rejection of plain
error. But that rejection warrants academic scrutiny—especially as we mark the
fortieth anniversary of these decisions this year—and this Article presents the
argument that it must now be rethought. Frady and Engle were premised on the
idea that plain error was less stringent than cause and prejudice, but subsequent
doctrinal developments have rendered that premise false. And beyond that, the
present-day manifestation of plain error much more effectively serves the core
purposes of habeas and procedural default. Given that, the choice of cause and
prejudice over plain error is now itself plainly erroneous.
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Bach LLP in New York and began this project while serving as a Quattrone Fellow at
the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An all-too-common feature of litigation is that not every claim is
raised when it should be. And when an argument comes too late,
courts—for a host of reasons—are disinclined to accept that argument
and will generally subject it to heightened scrutiny.1
Although there are a range of standards governing the treatment
of contentions not raised at the proper time,2 one of the most common
is “plain error” review. That standard often applies to arguments
raised for the first time on appeal in criminal matters,3 but it is
commonly invoked in a wide range of contexts.4 Plain error allows a
court to accept an untimely argument only where it reflects (1) an
error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) that
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.5
Despite plain error’s fairly widespread and open-ended
applicability, there is one important context in which it does not apply:
where claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings should have been,
but were not, timely presented at a pre-federal habeas stage.6 For such
“procedurally defaulted” claims, instead of plain error, the “cause and
prejudice” standard rules supreme.7 That standard, as its name
suggests, permits a federal habeas court to consider a defaulted claim
only if the petitioner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.”8

1

See, e.g., Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009); United States v.
Hodge, 902 F.3d 420, 429 (4th Cir. 2018).
2
See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–32 (1993) (plain error);
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (cause and prejudice); United States
v. Fattah, 858 F.3d 801, 807 (3d Cir. 2017) (exceptional circumstances and good
cause); Bailey v. United Airlines, 279 F.3d 194, 203–04 (3d Cir. 2002) (extraordinary
circumstances).
3
See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1060, 1061 (2020) (per curiam).
4
See, e.g., Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 602 F.3d 431, 437 (D.C.
Cir. 2010); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1424 (5th Cir. 1996)
(en banc); United States v. Simmons, Nos. 08-CR-1280 (VEC), 16-CV-2055 (VEC), 2020
WL 6381805, at * 4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2020); United States v. Rakow, No. CR 04-01563
MMM, 2007 WL 9751572, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2007).
5
See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999).
6
See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134–35 (1982); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 166–67 (1982).
7
See, e.g., Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); Coleman, 501 U.S. at
750.
8
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
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The choice of cause and prejudice over plain error for procedural
default in habeas proceedings stems from two 1982 Supreme Court
decisions, United States v. Frady and Engle v. Isaac. There, the Court
reasoned that plain error was inappropriate for procedural default
because it was meant to apply on direct review, and a more stringent
requirement was necessary to justify reaching untimely claims on
collateral review.9 That more stringent requirement, the Court
concluded, was cause and prejudice.10
Although these decisions have just turned forty years old this year,
this Article argues that it is time to reconsider them, for two reasons.
First, since Frady and Engle, the plain error and cause and prejudice
standards have developed in such a way that cause and prejudice
cannot be said to be more stringent than plain error. And second, the
modern version of plain error is a more appropriate choice for
procedural default, in light of the core purposes of habeas and default
doctrine.11
This Article’s analysis proceeds as follows. Part II introduces and
contextualizes the plain error and cause and prejudice standards, as
well as the Supreme Court’s decisions in Frady and Engle. Part III
presents the argument as to why plain error is now more appropriate
than cause and prejudice for procedural default. Part IV addresses and
rejects several counterarguments. Part V concludes.12

9

See Engle, 456 U.S. at 134–35; Frady, 456 U.S. at 164.
See Engle, 456 U.S. at 134–35; Frady, 456 U.S. at 166–67.
11
Although the Court’s decision to adopt cause and prejudice instead of plain
error has been criticized before, see, e.g., Jack A. Guttenberg, Federal Habeas Corpus,
Constitutional Rights, and Procedural Forfeitures: The Delicate Balance, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV.
617, 665–75 (1984), the issue has received surprisingly little academic attention,
especially after the first few years following Frady and Engle. This Article therefore
breaks new ground in questioning these decisions on the basis of more recent
developments.
12
As a point of clarification, my argument is not that plain error is the ideal or best
standard for procedural default. If, for instance, we were designing habeas doctrine
from scratch, it is certainly possible that a better standard could be developed. The
goal of this Article is simply to show that the decision to select cause and prejudice
over plain error no longer holds and should be rethought. It is not meant to suggest
that we should avoid consideration of other alternatives to improve the habeas system,
which is in many ways unfair. See, e.g., Radley Balko, Opinion, It’s Time to Repeal the
Worst Criminal Justice Law of the Past 30 Years, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/03/its-time-repeal-worstcriminal-justice-law-past-30-years.
10
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II. BACKGROUND
The law demands timeliness in litigants. It has long been said that
“the law should administer its benefits to those who are vigilant in
exercising their rights, and not to those who sleep over them.”13 And
courts often express that enforcing procedural regularity is necessary
for numerous reasons, including: to guard against sandbagging, or
strategically holding an argument in reserve in case of an unfavorable
decision;14 to facilitate the elimination of errors;15 to prevent unfair
surprise and the underdevelopment of issues;16 to promote finality;17
to respect the institutional roles of different tribunals;18 and to ensure
that the trial serves as the primary forum for resolving disputes.19
Accordingly, courts are generally disposed to grant relief only based
on claims, objections, or arguments that have been made at the
appropriate time—often the earliest feasible point—and to each court
in the litigation process.20

13

Ricard v. Williams, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 59, 116 (1822); see also In re Efron, 746
F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 2014) (“For over four centuries, persons learned in the law have
known that, when litigation is in prospect, vigilance is good and somnolence is
bad. . . . The lesson to be derived is that ‘[t]he law ministers to the vigilant not to those
who sleep upon perceptible rights.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
14
See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 481–82 (2011); Puckett v. United States,
556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977); Joseph Forrester
Trucking v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 987 F.3d 581, 592 (6th Cir. 2021);
United States v. Hodge, 902 F.3d 420, 429 (4th Cir. 2018); Muiruri v. Lynch, 803 F.3d
984, 987 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 709 (11th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 972 (1st Cir. 1995).
15
See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 286 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Hodge, 902 F.3d at 429; HTC Corp. v. IPCom GmbH & Co., 667 F.3d 1270,
1282 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Pielago, 135 F.3d at 709; United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006,
1013 (1st Cir. 1997); Taylor, 54 F.3d at 972; cf. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90.
16
See, e.g., Hodge, 902 F.3d at 429; In re Lett, 632 F.3d 1216, 1226–27 (11th Cir.
2011); Prime Time Int’l Co. v. Vilsak, 599 F.3d 678, 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Pielago, 135
F.3d at 709; Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 970–71 (10th Cir. 1991).
17
See, e.g., United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 73 (2002); Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); HTC Corp., 667 F.3d at 1281–82; In re Lett, 632 F.3d at 1226–
27; Hicks, 928 F.2d at 970–71.
18
See, e.g., Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; In re Lett, 632 F.3d at
1226–27; Miller v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 698, 701 (5th Cir. 2004); Roberts,
119 F.3d at 1013; United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 100 (1st Cir. 1987).
19
See, e.g., Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90; Prime Time Int’l Co., 599 F.3d at 686; Pielago, 135
F.3d at 709.
20
See, e.g., Joseph Forrester Trucking v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs,
987 F.3d 581, 592 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Joiner, 988 F.3d 993, 996 (7th Cir.
2021); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech. Supply Inc., 983 F.3d 307, 315 (7th Cir.
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Of course, assertions are still not always raised at the right time,
and at least when that happens unintentionally, the procedural
misstep is not unforgiveable.21 But, for all the reasons mentioned
above, courts subject untimely contentions to demanding and
unfavorable standards, which—although the details and formulations
vary—usually require some type of special circumstances. For
example, courts have required that there be “extraordinary” or
“exceptional” circumstances;22 that the issue raised amount to “plain
error”;23 that a party have “good cause” for failing to present an issue
earlier;24 or that a party be able to show “cause and prejudice.”25
The two standards most relevant here are the “plain error” and
“cause and prejudice” standards. The first, plain error, is rooted in
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b),26 which states: “A plain
error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it
was not brought to the court’s attention.”27 As presently interpreted,
that provision bestows discretion upon courts to correct an error, but
only if several conditions are met.28 As the Supreme Court has
explained the plain error doctrine:
[T]here must be (1) “error,” (2) that is “plain,” and (3) that
“affect[s] substantial rights.” If all three conditions are met,
an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice
a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error “seriously affect[s]

2020); United States v. Evans, 908 F.3d 346, 352 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v.
McKinley, 227 F.3d 716, 719 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Becker, 36 F.3d 708, 709
(7th Cir. 1994); Williams v. Bishop Coal Co., 981 F.2d 1253, 1992 WL 371951, at *2
(4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision).
21
See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1993). An intentional
decision not to pursue an issue generally precludes further consideration of that issue
altogether. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 2018); cf.
Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 472–73 (2012).
22
See, e.g., T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. Town of Barnstable, 969 F.3d 33, 40 n.2 (1st Cir.
2020); Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 799 (3d Cir. 2001).
23
See, e.g., Olano, 507 U.S. at 732–35; Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia,
602 F.3d 431, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
24
See, e.g., United States v. Vance, 893 F.3d 763, 769–70 (10th Cir. 2018); United
States v. Fattah, 858 F.3d 801, 807 (3d Cir. 2017).
25
See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 315–16 (2011).
26
The concept of plain error predates Rule 52(b), however. See United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.13 (1982).
27
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
28
See, e.g., Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2096–97 (2021); Rosales-Mireles
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904–05 (2018).
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the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”29
Meeting these requirements, as the Court has made clear, “is difficult,”
and the burden of demonstrating that they have been satisfied falls
squarely on the party invoking plain error review.30
Plain error archetypally applies to matters in criminal cases that
should have been presented to the district court but are instead raised
for the first time on direct appeal.31 The standard, however, is far from
limited to that context. Rather, it has often been applied to civil
cases,32 as well as to non-appellate proceedings.33 Thus, plain error is
an expansive doctrine that is widely applicable to a host of settings.
But it does not apply everywhere, and that leads us to the second
of the relevant standards. When someone convicted of a crime seeks
29
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997) (second and third
alterations in original) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2096–97;
Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904–05; Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
30
Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2097 (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135).
31
Cf. Davis v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1060, 1061 (2020) (per curiam) (“When a
criminal defendant fails to raise an argument in the district court, an appellate court
ordinarily may review the issue only for plain error.”); Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2096 (“Under
Rule 51(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant can preserve a
claim of error ‘by informing the court’ of the claimed error when the relevant ‘court
ruling or order is made or sought.’ If the defendant has ‘an opportunity to object’
and fails to do so, he forfeits the claim of error. If the defendant later raises the
forfeited claim on appeal, Rule 52(b)’s plain-error standard applies.” (citation
omitted)).
32
See, e.g., Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 786 (7th Cir. 2020); Richison v. Ernest
Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1127–28 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J.); Salazar ex rel. Salazar
v. District of Columbia, 602 F.3d 431, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Tilmon v. Prator, 368 F.3d
521, 524 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Gaydar v. Sociedad Instituto Gineco-Quirurgico
y Planificacion, 345 F.3d 15, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2003); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1424 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); see also ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2472 (3d ed. 2021) (“[A]lthough the Civil Rules, unlike the
Criminal Rules, do not contain a formal provision allowing the appellate courts to
notice plain error, that principle nonetheless appears well established.”); cf. FED. R.
CIV. P. 51(d)(2) & advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment (recognizing courts’
authority to review unpreserved objections to civil jury instructions “in exceptional
circumstances,” borrowing the plain error standard “from Criminal Rule 52”).
33
See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, Nos. 08-CR-1280 (VEC), 16-CV-2055 (VEC),
2020 WL 6381805, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2020); United States v. Montgomery, 442 F.
Supp. 3d 875, 884 (W.D. Pa. 2020); United States v. Pomales-Arzuaga, 319 F. Supp. 3d
578, 582–83 (D.P.R. 2018); Hill v. Quigley, 336 F. Supp. 3d 283, 288–89 (S.D.N.Y.
2018); Barthelus v. G4S Gov’t Sols., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2015);
United States v. Rakow, No. CR 04-01563 MMM, 2007 WL 9751572, at *7 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 12, 2007); United States v. Brandao, 448 F. Supp. 2d 311, 317–18 (D. Mass. 2006);
United States v. Birkett, 419 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (governing review of
federal convictions)34 or 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (governing review of state
convictions), they may raise new claims that were never presented
before, such as on direct review or state post-conviction review. Such
claims—among others, such as those that were rejected by the state
courts on procedural grounds35—are deemed “procedurally
defaulted,” and absent an excuse for the default, federal habeas courts
will not hear them.36 In that context, the courts have concluded that
plain error is an inappropriate standard for excusing default and have
imposed the so-called cause and prejudice standard instead.37 That
standard, unsurprisingly, demands that habeas petitioners38 show two
things: “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the
alleged violation of federal law.”39
Cause and prejudice won out over plain error in the procedural
default context as a result of two Supreme Court decisions, both issued

34

Of course, 2255 is formally a habeas substitute, not “true” habeas corpus. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774–75 (2008). I use “habeas” somewhat
colloquially, as nothing in this Article turns on employing more precise terminology.
35
See, e.g., Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017) (“[A] federal court may not
review federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court—that is, claims
that the state court denied based on an adequate and independent state procedural
rule.”).
36
See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 7, 9–10 (2012); Massaro v. United States,
538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). Under 2254, a claim that has never been raised before will
only be defaulted if the petitioner is unable to seek relief in the state courts due to a
state procedural rule. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731–32 (1991).
Otherwise, the claim is simply “unexhausted.” See id.
37
See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134–35 (1982); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 166–67 (1982); see also Walker v. United States, 810 F.3d 568, 573 (8th Cir. 2016).
Default can also be excused upon a showing of a “miscarriage of justice,” meaning
“actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392–93 (2013).
38
Convicted individuals seeking relief under 2254 are generally called
“petitioners,” whereas claimants under 2255 are termed “movants.” Cf., e.g., Brown v.
United States, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1344 n.7 (S.D. Ga. 2008) (“Current counsel,
perhaps used to litigating 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitions, seem to have forgotten that
before the Court is a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion—hence, a motion in a criminal case
(albeit packing a parallel civil file for docketing-statistic purposes)—which makes
Brown a defendant or movant, not a ‘petitioner.’”); Vega v. United States, 269 F. Supp.
2d 528, 528 n.1 (D.N.J. 2003) (“A party seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is
technically a movant rather than a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus.”). As courts
sometimes do, however, I use “petitioners” to refer to both types of claimants for
convenience. See Vega, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 528 n.1 (“We will refer to the movant as
petitioner, for ease of reference.”).
39
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
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on April 5, 1982: United States v. Frady and Engle v. Isaac.40 These
decisions are crucial to this Article’s analysis, and I describe each in
turn.
In Frady, a federal prisoner sought relief under 2255, and the D.C.
Circuit overturned his conviction after concluding that his jury
instructions had been plainly erroneous.41 The Supreme Court
reversed, however, primarily on the ground that a more stringent
standard than plain error was necessary in the procedural default
context. It concluded that plain error was designed for direct review,
and on collateral review, “a prisoner must clear a significantly higher
hurdle than would exist on direct appeal.”42 More specifically, it said:
Because it was intended for use on direct appeal . . . the
“plain error” standard is out of place when a prisoner
launches a collateral attack against a criminal conviction
after society’s legitimate interest in the finality of the
judgment has been perfected by the expiration of the time
allowed for direct review or by the affirmance of the
conviction on appeal. . . .
By adopting the same standard of review for § 2255 motions
as would be applied on direct appeal, the Court of Appeals
accorded no significance whatever to the existence of a final
judgment perfected by appeal. Once the defendant’s chance
to appeal has been waived or exhausted, however, we are
entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally convicted,
especially when, as here, he already has had a fair
opportunity to present his federal claims to a federal forum.
Our trial and appellate procedures are not so unreliable that
we may not afford their completed operation any binding
effect beyond the next in a series of endless postconviction
collateral attacks. To the contrary, a final judgment
commands respect.43
The Frady Court then went on to determine what the appropriate
“higher hurdle” standard for procedural default in 2255 proceedings
should be, settling (with little analysis) on cause and prejudice.44
As just noted, the Supreme Court decided Engle v. Isaac on the
same day as Frady. There, several 2254 petitioners argued that the
Court “should replace or supplement the cause-and-prejudice
40
41
42
43
44

See Engle, 456 U.S. at 134–35; Frady, 456 U.S. at 166–67.
Frady, 456 U.S. at 157–59.
Id. at 164–66.
Id. at 164–65.
Id. at 166–67.
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standard”—which was at that time broadly, but not universally,
applicable in the 2254 context45—“with a plain-error inquiry.”46 The
Court, however, rejected that argument, finding it “no more
compelling” than in Frady.47 It primarily reasoned as follows:
The federal courts apply a plain-error rule for direct review
of federal convictions. Federal habeas challenges to state
convictions, however, entail greater finality problems and
special comity concerns. We remain convinced that the
burden of justifying federal habeas relief for state prisoners
is “greater than the showing required to establish plain error
on direct appeal.”48
Thus, the Court again chose cause and prejudice over plain error in
the procedural default context because it determined that a standard

45

In the 1963 decision of Fay v. Noia, the Supreme Court endorsed a lenient
procedural default standard, concluding that “a procedural default in state court does
not bar federal habeas review unless the petitioner has deliberately bypassed state
procedures by intentionally forgoing an opportunity for state review.” Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 744–45 (1991) (emphasis added). Then, in Wainwright v.
Sykes, the Court “limited Fay to its facts”—situations “where a petitioner has
surrendered entirely his right to appeal his state conviction”—and applied the cause
and prejudice framework to failures to comply with a contemporaneous objection rule
in state court. Id. at 746–47. In doing so, the Court drew upon earlier cases that had
adopted the cause and prejudice requirement in the context of failures to raise grand
jury objections before trial, and it employed expansive language and reasoning that
suggested a broadly applicable rule. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84–91
(1977); see also Crick v. Smith, 650 F.2d 860, 867 (6th Cir. 1981) (“While Wainwright
attacked the overly broad language of Fay, its own language also speaks broadly
concerning the underlying values of the two rules. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist’s
rationale for application of the ‘cause’ and ‘prejudice’ rule appears to apply as well to
failures to appeal altogether as to other types of defaults.” (citation omitted)). But it
formally treated the ruling as a narrow one that did not set an across-the-board
standard. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88 n.12 (“The Court in Fay stated its knowing-anddeliberate-waiver rule in language which applied not only to the waiver of the right to
appeal, but to failures to raise individual substantive objections in the state trial. Then,
with a single sentence in a footnote, the Court swept aside all decisions of this Court
‘to the extent that (they) may be read to suggest a standard of discretion in federal
habeas corpus proceedings different from what we lay down today . . . .’ We do not
choose to paint with a similarly broad brush here.” (citation omitted)); see also White
v. Sowders, 644 F.2d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir. 1980) (“Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the
majority, appeared equally intent on crafting a relatively narrow rule.”). Cause and
prejudice did not become the universal rule until the 1991 decision of Coleman v.
Thompson. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
46
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 134–35 (citations omitted).
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more stringent than that on direct review (of federal convictions) was
necessary.49
So to summarize, the failure to raise arguments at the right time
can be forgiven, and often the standard applicable to inappropriately
timed assertions is plain error. But the Supreme Court has held that
for procedurally defaulted claims on federal habeas review, a stricter
standard than that used on direct review is required and, accordingly,
that cause and prejudice should set the rule rather than plain error.
That holding remains in force today.
III. WHY PLAIN ERROR IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAN CAUSE AND
PREJUDICE FOR PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
Although cause and prejudice has remained ascendant over plain
error in the procedural default context for forty years, there is a serious
problem with that ascendancy: the very basis for it no longer holds
today. And what’s more, as the doctrine currently stands, plain error
is a much more appropriate standard for procedural default than
cause and prejudice.
Accordingly, Frady and Engle must be
reconsidered.
49

In Frady, the Court also concluded that it had already determined “that the plainerror standard is inappropriate for the review of a state prisoner’s collateral attack” in
the 1977 case of Henderson v. Kibbe. Frady, 456 U.S. at 165–66. And given that
foundation, it supported its decision by comparing the federal conviction context to
the state conviction context and explaining why its reasoning as to the latter should
hold for the former. See id. at 166 (“Of course, unlike in the case before us, in Kibbe
the final judgment of a state, not a federal, court was under attack, so considerations
of comity were at issue that do not constrain us here. But the Federal Government,
no less than the States, has an interest in the finality of its criminal judgments. In
addition, a federal prisoner like Frady, unlike his state counterparts, has already had
an opportunity to present his federal claims in federal trial and appellate forums. On
balance, we see no basis for affording federal prisoners a preferred status when they
seek postconviction relief.”). The assertion that the Court had previously decided the
plain error question in the state court context is questionable, see Guttenberg, supra
note 11, at 672–73 (“The Court’s reliance on Kibbe, however, was inappropriate
because that case involved the proper standard for determining when erroneous jury
instructions violate fourteenth amendment due process. In fact, Kibbe merely stated
the unnoteworthy conclusion that the proof needed to establish a constitutional
violation is greater than that needed to excuse a procedural forfeiture. The Court in
Kibbe was not commenting on the use of plain error in a collateral proceeding, since
this issue was not under consideration.”), but it rendered Engle essentially a foregone
conclusion. And indeed, Engle likewise invoked Kibbe in rejecting the petitioners’
argument for plain error. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 134–35 (“We remain convinced that
the burden of justifying federal habeas relief for state prisoners is ‘greater than the
showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal.’” (quoting Henderson v.
Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977))).
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A. Cause and Prejudice Is No Longer More Demanding than Plain
Error
As discussed in detail above, the primary reason for the Supreme
Court’s selection of cause and prejudice over plain error for
procedural default is that a more demanding standard is necessary in
that context. Therefore, if cause and prejudice is not more demanding
than plain error, then the Court’s choice is without foundation. And
due to the evolution of plain error and cause and prejudice over time,
that is precisely the case today.
At the time of Frady and Engle, plain error was an ill-defined
concept. Instead of the clear, four-prong test described above, the
doctrine reflected a vague judicial authority to correct serious errors,
and courts applied it inconsistently.50 Indeed, as Federal Practice and
Procedure describes it, around that time:
[L]ower courts endeavored to put a gloss on the rule by
defining the kind of error for which they can reverse under
Rule 52(b). Thus it was said that “plain error” means “error
both obvious and substantial,” or “serious and manifest
errors,” or “seriously prejudicial error,” or “grave errors
which seriously affect substantial rights of the accused.”
Perhaps these attempts to define “plain error” did no
appreciable harm, but it was doubtful whether they were of
much help. A sounder perception was that whether an
appellate court should take notice of an error not raised
below must be made on the facts of the particular case, and
there were no “hard and fast classifications in either the
application of the principle or the use of a descriptive title.”
Indeed the cases have given the distinct impression that “plain error”
is a concept appellate courts have found impossible to define, save
that they know it when they see it.51
50
See Guttenberg, supra note 11, at 674 (“Although the lower courts have not been
consistent in their interpretation or application of the plain error rule, there is
substantial agreement that the rule is to be applied cautiously and, at a minimum, to
correct errors which would cause a miscarriage of justice if left unattended.”).
51
3B PETER J. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 856 (4th ed.
2021) (emphasis added); accord, e.g., United States v. De Rosa, 548 F.2d 464, 472 n.12
(3d Cir. 1977) (“While plain error is a concept ‘appellate courts find impossible to
define save that they know it when they see it,’ it has been equated by this Court to
error giving rise to a ‘manifest miscarriage of justice,’ or error of a constitutional
dimension.” (citations omitted)); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal
Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1213 (1986) (“Plain error, a doctrine of excuse found in
the federal courts and most states, is ‘a concept appellate courts find impossible to
define, save that they know it when they see it.’ Application of such a doctrine tends
to be extremely fact specific, perhaps bordering upon the ad hoc.” (citation omitted)).
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Furthermore, Frady itself depicted plain error simply as a power of
correction “to be used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which
a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”52 And in the year
following that decision, the D.C. Circuit—the court reversed in Frady—
approvingly quoted the italicized language from Federal Practice and
Procedure above indicating that courts only know plain error “when they
see it” (which also had been present in the contemporary edition of
the treatise).53
Cause and prejudice, although somewhat more concrete,54 was
likewise fairly nebulous when Frady and Engle were decided. Just a few
years before, in invoking cause and prejudice to refuse to excuse a
default, the Court in Wainwright v. Sykes explained:
The “cause”-and-“prejudice” exception . . . will afford an
adequate guarantee, we think, that the rule will not prevent
a federal habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the
federal constitutional claim of a defendant who in the
absence of such an adjudication will be the victim of a
miscarriage of justice. Whatever precise content may be given those
terms by later cases, we feel confident in holding without further
elaboration that they do not exist here.55
And that ambiguity was affirmatively acknowledged in Frady.56
Because of the then-existing uncertainty about the meaning of
plain error and cause and prejudice, it is entirely understandable that
the Court concluded the latter standard was more demanding than the

52

Frady, 456 U.S. at 163 n.14.
United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1341 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citation
omitted).
54
See Frady, 456 U.S. at 167–68 (“Under this standard, to obtain collateral relief
based on trial errors to which no contemporaneous objection was made, a convicted
defendant must show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing his . . . procedural default, and (2)
‘actual prejudice’ resulting from the errors of which he complains.”).
55
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90–91 (1977) (emphasis added).
56
See Frady, 456 U.S. at 168 (“In considering the prejudice, if any, occasioned by
the erroneous jury instructions used at Frady’s trial, we note that in Wainwright v. Sykes
we refrained from giving ‘precise content’ to the term ‘prejudice,’ expressly leaving to
future cases further elaboration of the significance of that term.”). The Frady Court
did, however, provide clarity as to the meaning of prejudice in the specific context at
issue in the case, i.e., for “a defendant who has failed to object to jury instructions at
trial.” Id. at 168–69 (explaining that the standard of prejudice in that context is
“‘whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting
conviction violates due process,’ not merely whether ‘the instruction is undesirable,
erroneous, or even universally condemned’” (citation omitted)).
53
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former. But as the Court later gave substance and meaning to those
standards, it (seemingly inadvertently) undermined that balance.
First and foremost, the modern plain error standard encompasses
a substantially narrower subset of errors than cause and prejudice does.
About a decade after Frady and Engle, the Supreme Court decided
United States v. Olano, which formally established the modern four-part
framework for plain error review.57 That framework, in turn, has led
to several distinct elements that go far beyond what the cause and
prejudice standard requires. For instance, the plain error rule
demands that the error to be corrected must be “plain,” which has
been interpreted to mean that the error “must be clear or obvious,
rather than subject to reasonable dispute.”58 And likewise, courts are
only supposed to exercise their discretion to correct an error if it
“seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings,” which is “‘a case-specific and fact-intensive’ inquiry”59
that can undermine a finding of plain error even if the other
requirements are met.60 Cause and prejudice, in contrast, permits
review of any error, whether or not that error is debatable and whether
or not it impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

57

See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993); accord HENNING, supra
note 51, § 856; see also United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 1995)
(showing that Olano clarified plain error and established the modern test); United
States v. Merlos, 8 F.3d 48, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same). Recall that plain error requires:
(1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) that seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See supra
note 29 and accompanying text.
58
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
59
Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1906, 1909 (2018) (citations
omitted).
60
See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632–33 (2002) (concluding that
an error “did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings” because the evidence “was ‘overwhelming’ and ‘essentially
uncontroverted,’” even if the error were structural and therefore might not require a
showing of prejudice to satisfy the “substantial rights” prong of plain error); Johnson
v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–70 (1997) (same); United States v. Banks, 29 F.4th
168, 179 (4th Cir. 2022) (same); see also United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320, 344
(3d Cir. 2020) (“Because ‘each case necessarily turns on its own facts,’ an appellate
court’s exercise of discretion is properly based on its evaluation of which result would
most ‘promote the ends of justice.’ In conducting this evaluation, the Court has
frequently weighed the costs to the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial
proceedings that would result from allowing the error to stand with those that would
alternatively result from providing a remedy.” (citation omitted)).
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judicial proceedings, so long as there is cause for the failure to raise it
at the appropriate time and prejudice as a result.61
Additionally, plain error and cause and prejudice seem to be
subject to the same “prejudice” standard, or at least effectively the same
standard.62 To meet the “affects substantial rights” prong of plain error
review, the Supreme Court has said that a petitioner generally needs
to demonstrate that the error prejudiced them in some way.63 And in
the 2004 decision of United States v. Dominguez Benitez, the Court
concluded that the appropriate standard for that showing is the
standard of prejudice for ineffective assistance of counsel claims and
of “materiality” for Brady claims: “a reasonable probability that, but for
[the issue complained of], the result of the proceeding would have
been different.”64 Likewise, in the 1999 decision of Strickler v. Greene,
the Supreme Court equated the Brady materiality standard to the
prejudice standard for cause and prejudice.65 In line with that
authority, moreover, numerous federal appellate decisions have
reasoned that the prejudice prong of cause and prejudice is equivalent
61

Cf. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006) (“As a general rule, claims forfeited
under state law may support federal habeas relief only if the prisoner demonstrates
cause for the default and prejudice from the asserted error.”).
62
See, e.g., Justin Murray, Policing Procedural Error in the Lower Criminal Courts, 89
FORDHAM L. REV. 1411, 1467–68 (2021).
63
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (“[I]n most cases [the ‘affects
substantial rights’ language] means that the error must have been prejudicial: It must
have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.”).
64
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81–83 (2004). The ineffective
assistance prejudice standard and the Brady materiality standard are viewed as
essentially the same, see, e.g., Waiters v. Lee, 857 F.3d 466, 487 n.3 (2d Cir. 2017)
(Jacobs, J., dissenting) (collecting cases from every other circuit stating that the
standards for Brady materiality and prejudice for ineffective assistance claims are the
same or equivalent), and they share the same roots, see, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 299 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]n
United States v. Bagley, we embraced ‘reasonable probability’ as the appropriate
standard to judge the materiality of information withheld by the prosecution whether
or not the defense had asked first. Bagley took that phrase from Strickland v.
Washington, where it had been used for the level of prejudice needed to make out a
claim of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.” (citation omitted));
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (“[T]he appropriate test for
prejudice [in the ineffective assistance context] finds its roots in the test for materiality
of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution.”).
65
See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280, 282, 289, 296; accord Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,
691 (2004) (“[C]oincident with the third Brady component (prejudice), prejudice
within the compass of the ‘cause and prejudice’ requirement exists when the
suppressed evidence is ‘material’ for Brady purposes.” (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at
282)).
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to ineffective assistance prejudice or Brady materiality.66 Thus, the
modern iteration of the prejudice component of cause and prejudice
does not meaningfully differentiate that standard from the modern
iteration of plain error.67
Now, to be sure, cause and prejudice remains more demanding
than plain error insofar as it compels a showing of “cause.” That
requirement is not easy to meet: it requires “something external to the
petitioner,” such as a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
attorney abandonment, the previous unavailability of “the factual or

66

For the equivalency between the prejudice inquiries for ineffective assistance
and cause and prejudice, see, for example, Chase v. MaCauley, 971 F.3d 582, 595–96
(6th Cir. 2020); Thomas v. Payne, 960 F.3d 465, 477 (8th Cir. 2020); Harris v. Comm’r,
Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 874 F.3d 682, 688 (11th Cir. 2017); Grueninger v. Dir., Va. Dep’t
of Corr., 813 F.3d 517, 532 & n.13 (4th Cir. 2016); Ambrose v. Booker, 801 F.3d 567,
578, 584 (6th Cir. 2015); Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1147 n.86 (11th Cir. 2000);
Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35, 49–50 (1st Cir. 2006); Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636,
649 & n.6 (1st Cir. 2002). And for the equivalency between Brady materiality and the
prejudice prong of cause and prejudice, see, for example, Simpson v. Carpenter, 912
F.3d 542, 571 (10th Cir. 2018); Juniper v. Zook, 876 F.3d 551, 564 n.6 (4th Cir. 2017);
Canales v. Stephens, 765 F.3d 551, 574–75 (5th Cir. 2014); Jones v. Bagley, 696 F.3d
475, 486–87 (6th Cir. 2012); Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 231 n.3 (6th Cir. 2008) (en
banc); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 132 (3d Cir. 2007).
The contours of prejudice for cause and prejudice are not perfectly settled. For
instance, the Sixth Circuit has said both that prejudice for cause and prejudice is more
stringent than for ineffective assistance claims and that the two standards are
equivalent. Compare Jones v. Bell, 801 F.3d 556, 563–64 (6th Cir. 2015), with Ambrose,
801 F.3d at 578, 584. But the foregoing analysis makes clear that the standards
discussed above broadly mirror each other, even if there are courts or decisions that
suggest some ambiguity or possibility of difference.
67
That is important, at least in part, because Frady (unlike Engle) addressed only
prejudice (and not cause), and so differentiated cause and prejudice and plain error
based on a perceived distinction in these standards’ prejudice requirements. See
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167–68 (1982); cf. James S. Liebman & Randy
Hertz, Brecht v. Abrahamson: Harmful Error in Habeas Corpus Law, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1136 n.117 (1994) (“[T]he Court has carefully noted that the
appellant’s burden of showing ‘plain error’ under Rule 52(b) is a lesser burden than
is the burden borne by a prisoner attempting to show ‘cause and prejudice’ under
Wainwright v. Sykes, and a fortiori, than the burden borne by a defendant attempting
to establish the ‘materiality’ element of a ‘suppression of evidence’ violation under
Bagley, or the ‘prejudice’ element of an ‘ineffective assistance’ violation under
Strickland.” (citations omitted)). And in fact, in light of Frady and its progeny (and
notwithstanding the evolution of the plain error and cause and prejudice standards
described above), some decisions have expressed the view that the prejudice required
for cause and prejudice is greater than that required for plain error. See, e.g., United
States v. Pettigrew, 346 F.3d 1139, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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legal basis for a claim,” or “interference by officials.”68 And it is not
satisfied, for instance, by mere attorney neglect, a claim of
constitutionally ineffective assistance that itself is unexhausted or
defaulted, the novelty of a claim that was not entirely unavailable
beforehand, or the futility of raising a particular argument (that
Supreme Court precedent has not foreclosed).69 Furthermore,
because the reason for failing to raise an issue is analytically distinct
from the merits of that issue, the cause requirement can eliminate
claims regardless of their strength.70 Plain error has no such cause
requirement, and its elements are all primarily focused on the
seriousness of the error at issue.71
Nevertheless, plain error can still be considered more stringent
with respect to cause, at least in a sense. If a habeas petitioner is able
to show cause for defaulting a prejudicial issue, their claim is generally

68
Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280–81 (2012) (citation omitted); Strickler, 527
U.S. at 283 n.24 (citation omitted); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753–54
(1991) (citations omitted); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citation
omitted); see Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2065 (2017); Edwards v. Carpenter, 529
U.S. 446, 451–52 (2000).
69
See Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2065; Maples, 565 U.S. at 280–81; Edwards, 529 U.S. at
452–53; Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753;
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488; Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536–37 (1986); Gatewood v.
United States, 979 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2020); Lassend v. United States, 898 F.3d
115, 122–23 (1st Cir. 2018).
70
See, e.g., Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The Great Writ Hit: The Curtailment of Habeas Corpus
in Georgia Since 1967, 7 J. MARSHALL L.J. 415, 460–61 (2014); John C. Jeffries, Jr. &
William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 690 (1990).
71
Cf., e.g., Guttenberg, supra note 11, at 674; Meltzer, supra note 51, at 1207. The
“fairness, integrity, or public reputation” element is flexible and can extend beyond
the substance of a case in some circumstances—such as by considering the likelihood
of strategic behavior in failing to timely raise a claim. See infra Part IV.C. But the
inquiry is overwhelmingly focused on merits-related issues—generally evaluating
factors like “the error’s effect on the values or interests protected by the violated right,”
prejudice, and “the relative ease of correcting the error”—which makes sense, given
that this element, at bottom, simply asks whether correcting an error would “promote
the ends of justice.” United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2020)
(citations omitted). In line with that, moreover, even when a non-merits point is
considered, it only operates as a “thumb-on-the-scale” consideration within a broadly
holistic analysis, meaning that any merits-related points are still highly relevant. See,
e.g., United States v. Shwayder, 312 F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir. 2000); cf. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 142
(2009) (“The fourth prong is meant to be applied on a case-specific and fact-intensive
basis. We have emphasized that a ‘per se approach to plain-error review is flawed.’”
(citation omitted)).
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reviewed de novo.72 Under plain error, in contrast, even if the
complainant has a good reason for failing to preserve an error that
prejudiced them, there is no exception to the doctrine’s additional
requirements: that the error be beyond reasonable dispute and
seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.73 In short, cause and prejudice permits full review of any
72
See, e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 301–02 (2013); Atwood v. Ryan, 870
F.3d 1033, 1060 n.22 (9th Cir. 2017); Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230,
236 (3d Cir. 2017). Courts rarely discuss the standard of review in 2255 cases (i.e., the
standard a district court in a 2255 proceeding applies to the trial/sentencing
proceedings), but the general standard is de novo, see, e.g., Valentine v. United States,
488 F.3d 325, 343–44, 343 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); United States v. Williams, No. 1:15-cr-119, 2019 WL 2610688, at *6
(S.D. Ohio June 26, 2016); Barnes v. Hammer, No. 12–2745 (PAM/SER), 2013 WL
5488531, at *16 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2013), and that carries through to defaulted claims
where cause and prejudice is shown, see, e.g., United States v. LaPrade, 673 F. App’x
198, 205 (3d Cir. 2016); United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337–41 (9th Cir.
1993); Serrano v. United States, No. 3:19-cv-00719, 2020 WL 5653478, at *10, 15–16
(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2020); Moore v. United States, Nos. 20-cv-476-bbc, 07-cr-137-bbc,
2020 WL 4785432, at * 5 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 2020); United States v. Chea, Nos. 98-cr20005-1 CW, 98-cr-40003-2 CW, 2019 WL 5061085, at *6–13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2019);
United States v. Smith, No. 3:08CR283, 2019 WL 4675369, at *2–3, 5–7 (E.D. Va. Sept.
25, 2019); Camacho v. United States, Nos. 17 Civ. 5199 (AKH), 13 Cr. 58 (AKH), 2019
WL 3838395, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2019); Lilley v. United States, No. C160410JLR, 2016 WL 6997037, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2016); United States v.
Martinez, No. 10–cr–00214–CMA, 2016 WL 6997266, at *6 (D. Colo. Nov. 30, 2016);
United States v. Hernandez, 450 F. Supp. 2d 950, 965–66 (N.D. Iowa 2006).
There are exceptions. For instance, if there are factual findings relevant to a defaulted
but excused claim, these will be reviewed for clear error in 2254 proceedings, see, e.g.,
Ambrose v. Booker, 684 F.3d 638, 645 (6th Cir. 2012), and some decisions have
suggested that a similar standard applies in 2255 proceedings as well, see, e.g., Story v.
United States, No. 2:17-CV-00144-JRG-CRW, 2020 WL 6141047, at *11 (E.D. Tenn.
Oct. 19, 2020); United States v. Clark, No. 2:14-cr-20199, 2018 WL 3207975, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. June 29, 2018). But such exceptions do not impact the discussion here. In the
main, the merits of defaulted but excused claims are reviewed de novo.
73
Cf, e.g., Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2099 (2021) (explaining that the
futility of raising an argument does not change whether plain error applies); United
States v. Marshall, 754 F. App’x 157, 160 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he reasons for the failure
to object do not alter the [plain error] standard of review.”); United States v. McIvery,
806 F.3d 645, 651 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Even when the law changes between the time of a
lower court ruling and the time a subsequent appeal is heard, objections not
interposed before the lower court are deemed forfeited and are reviewed for plain
error.”); Swanson v. United States, 692 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2012) (suggesting that
plain error review would apply even if counsel had been ineffective in failing to raise
an issue).
Of course, a party can argue that an issue was not forfeited (to avoid plain error
review), and the reason for the failure to raise it earlier can be relevant in that context.
Cf., e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 919 F.3d 629, 635 (1st Cir. 2019) (explaining that
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prejudicial error so long as the complainant had a good reason for
failing to raise it, but plain error does not.
In sum, although the Supreme Court chose cause and prejudice
over plain error because the Court perceived it to be the more
stringent standard, that perception is no longer accurate. Rather,
plain error now contains rigorous elements that cause and prejudice
does not; the two doctrines impose essentially the same standard of
prejudice; and even as to the only distinct component of cause and
prejudice—the cause requirement—plain error can be viewed as more
onerous. Thus, the core logic of Frady and Engle no longer holds.
B. Plain Error Better Vindicates the Principles of Habeas and
Procedural Default than Cause and Prejudice
That is not the only reason why we should rethink Frady and Engle,
however. In addition, plain error’s present-day formulation is simply
a much better option for procedural default than cause and prejudice,
in light of the key principles applicable to habeas and default doctrine.
First, and most importantly, even though plain error is in many
ways more demanding than cause and prejudice, it aligns much better
with habeas’s core purpose of serving as “a bulwark against convictions
that violate fundamental fairness” and “a guard against extreme
malfunctions in . . . criminal justice systems.”74 Because the cause
requirement focuses only on why a claim was not raised earlier—rather
than on the severity of the asserted error—and narrowly defines
sufficient “cause,” it can easily bar relief or prevent review on the merits
for even strong claims involving significant constitutional violations.75
plain error does not apply where a defendant “had no realistic opportunity to object
before the entry of judgment”); United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 202 n.11 (5th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[E]ither Young did object to the report; or he did not object
but the Magistrate Judge did not warn him of the consequences. Each possibility allows
Young to avoid plain error review.”). But habeas petitioners can make similar
arguments (to avoid cause and prejudice), likewise pointing to why they are raising
their claim for the first time on habeas review. Cf., e.g., Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621–22
(acknowledging a narrow “exception to the procedural default rule for claims that
could not be presented without further factual development”); Massaro v. United
States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (similar); United States v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147,
1149 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (making a similar point and connecting the reasoning of
Bousley and Massaro). The point here is that plain error permits no cause-based
exception for claims that are forfeited.
74
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 747 (citation omitted); Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316
(2015) (citation omitted).
75
Cf., e.g., Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 975 F.3d 1145, 1163 (11th
Cir. 2020) (“[B]ecause Ledford cannot establish cause or prejudice to excuse the
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The likelihood of that result is amplified, moreover, by the fact that
litigating procedural default can be quite challenging for federal
habeas petitioners. The doctrine can be complex and unintuitive,76

default of his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim, that claim cannot serve
as cause to excuse the default of his juror-misconduct claim.”); Dickerson v. Warden,
750 F. App’x 458, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2018) (rejecting an argument that “state court delay
in sending [the petitioner] its decision” was cause); Jeter v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
479 F. App’x 286, 288 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Jeter alleges that he retained
counsel to file a Rule 3.850 motion, but the attorney did not file the motion before the
deadline, maybe because the attorney had died. . . . We cannot say that two affidavits
from Jeter’s family members and Jeter’s own assertions provide clear and convincing
evidence that the Florida court’s finding [that he had not retained counsel] was
incorrect.”); Bonilla v. Hurley, 370 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(concluding that the petitioner’s asserted “pro se status,” “ignorance of the law and
procedural requirements for filing a timely notice of appeal,” “mistaken belief that he
required a complete copy of his trial transcripts prior to filing a notice of appeal,”
restricted “time in the prison law library,” and “unfamiliarity with the English
language” did not show cause); Clemons v. McAdory, 58 F. App’x 657, 661 (7th Cir.
2003) (“Clemons asserts that he did not exhaust his gang testimony/tattoo display
claim because he is not smart enough to comply with court rules on his own, and he
believed that his lawyer was preparing all the necessary paperwork for his appeal.
These reasons are clearly insufficient.”); Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 378–79 (9th Cir.
1997) (rejecting an argument that the petitioner “has shown cause for his procedural
default because he left Oregon [without permission] to seek medical treatment for a
life-threatening heart condition that could not be treated in Oregon” because it “boils
down to an assertion that it was unfair”—but not unconstitutional—“for the state to
apply its fugitive disentitlement doctrine to him”); Fairfax v. Scott, 39 F.3d 319, 1994
WL 612311, at *2–3 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision)
(“Fairfax counters that cause exists because he did not receive notification that his
conviction and sentence were affirmed within the period allotted for filing a [petition
for discretionary review] or an extension of time to file same. . . . By his own
admission, Fairfax did not file for an extension of time in the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeal. He has not shown cause, only negligence on his own part.”); Steele v. Young,
11 F.3d 1518, 1522 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Steele’s status as a pro se petitioner and his
deficiencies in reading and writing skills are not external factors that prevented Steele
or his counsel from raising the double jeopardy issue on direct appeal.”); Fletcher v.
McCormick, 951 F.2d 359, 1991 WL 279107, at *2 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table
decision) (“Although Fletcher provides detailed allegations of beatings during his
imprisonment, he makes only cursory allegations that guards interfered with his ability
to file pleadings.”); see also Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the
Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 65, 113 (“Almost all procedural defaults are the result of
defense attorney mistakes. The narrow definition of ‘cause,’ however, means that most
such mistakes will not excuse the default; anything short of truly awful attorney
behavior will not suffice. Thus, defendants are routinely penalized for their lawyers’
errors.”); Wilkes, supra note 70, at 461 (similar).
76
See, e.g., Shelly Richter, Racing Against the Clock: Why California Should Reform Its
Timeliness Framework for Habeas Corpus Petitions, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2633, 2672 (2021);
Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 75, at 112–13; M. Shanara Gilbert, Racism and
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most (non-capital) petitioners are pro se, and they commonly face
circumstances that render litigating pro se difficult, such as restricted
freedoms and resources, illiteracy, learning disabilities, and mental
illness.77 And what’s more, when the cause requirement eliminates a
claim on a non-merits basis, it may well be extinguishing that claim’s
only opportunity for merits review, since a default, by its nature, means
that the claim was never before raised or had been previously rejected
on procedural grounds.78 Thus, to put it in the words of Justice
Brennan, “the only thing clear about the Court’s ‘cause’-and‘prejudice’ standard is that it exhibits the notable tendency of keeping
prisoners in jail without addressing their constitutional complaints.”79
That remains true even in circumstances where the merits are
potentially relevant to the cause inquiry, such as when a petitioner
asserts that he could not have previously raised a Brady claim because
the prosecution withheld the Brady evidence at issue,80 or when

Retrenchment in Capital Sentencing: Judicial and Congressional Haste Toward the Ultimate
Injustice, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 51, 74 n.122 (1991).
77
See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 621 (2005); David M. Shapiro &
Charles Hogle, The Horror Chamber: Unqualified Impunity in Prison, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2021, 2052–53 (2018); Emily Garcia Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to
Gladiators: The Post-AEDPA Access-to-Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in
Federal Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1219, 1223, 1252–54 (2012); Margaret
Smilowitz, Comment, What Happens After the Right to Counsel Ends? Using Technology to
Assist Petitioners in State Post-Conviction Petitions and Federal Habeas Review, 107 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 493, 498–99 (2017); cf. Buckley v. Lockhart, 892 F.2d 715, 724 (8th
Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (“This case exemplifies the labyrinth that prisoners
must negotiate when state courts do not address their petitions on their merits and bar
certain claims because of procedural default. Few prisoners are equipped to navigate
this procedural maze. Although current law forces us to recognize procedural default,
it also causes us to deny relief to petitioners who may deserve it.”).
78
Cf., e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 301–02 (2013) (explaining that there
is a presumption that federal claims in state court were “adjudicated on the merits”
but that it can be rebutted, inter alia, “for the purpose of showing that the federal
claim should be regarded as procedurally defaulted”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 433
(1963) (indicating that a procedural default in state court would likely result in a
habeas petitioner “forfeit[ing] his state remedies, appellate and collateral, as well as
direct review thereof in [the Supreme] Court”). To be sure, this is not always the case.
It could be, for example, that a claim was raised in the trial court and defaulted
through the failure to press that claim on appeal. But the cause requirement at least
often eliminates all merits review of a claim.
79
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 116 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord,
e.g., Wilkes, supra note 70, at 460–61; Henry B. Robertson, The Needle in the Haystack:
Towards a New State Postconviction Remedy, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 344–45 (1992).
80
See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004); Hughbanks v. Hudson, 2
F.4th 527, 535–36 (6th Cir. 2021).
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ineffective assistance of counsel is offered as the reason for having
failed to assert some underlying claim.81 With respect to the former
example, courts will find a Brady claim defaulted notwithstanding the
suppression of Brady evidence if the suppression was not “the reason”
for the default, for instance if the petitioner had sufficient information
to pursue the claim at an earlier point.82 And as to the latter example—
where ineffective assistance is employed to try to excuse a default—
there are a host of non-merits barriers to a finding of cause. For
instance, a court might conclude that regardless of whether a
constitutional violation occurred—even one amounting to plain
error—it was not objectively unreasonable for counsel to fail to raise it
(e.g., because there was a strategic reason for not objecting, other
attorneys might have done the same, or the error was not obvious at
the time counsel should have raised the issue).83 Or, a court could
decide that a claim of ineffective assistance is not cause because that
claim was itself defaulted.84 And if the ineffectiveness of state
postconviction counsel is offered as cause, a court might find that the
case does not fit into the exceedingly narrow set of circumstances
where that cause is sufficient: where (1) the defaulted claim is
ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) state law actually or effectively
prohibits bringing such claims on direct review; and (3) the default
81

See, e.g., Atwood v. Ryan, 870 F.3d 1033, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2017); Moore v.
Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 778 (6th Cir. 2013); Hoffner v. Bradshaw, 622 F.3d 487, 504
(6th Cir. 2010); cf. Amy Knight Burns, Note, Insurmountable Obstacles: Structural Errors,
Procedural Default, and Ineffective Assistance, 64 STAN. L. REV. 727, 730 (2012) (“[T]he
most common ‘cause’ accepted in [procedural default] cases is a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel—where the claim was not raised below because the petitioner’s
lawyer unreasonably failed to raise it.”).
82
Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2013); accord, e.g., Snow v. Baker,
820 F. App’x 541, 542 (9th Cir. 2020); Sullivan v. United States, 587 F. App’x 935, 943–
44 (6th Cir. 2014); Fisher v. Rozum, 441 F. App’x 115, 118 (3d Cir. 2011); Hutchison
v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 741–43 (6th Cir. 2002); Cannon v. Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253, 1269
(10th Cir. 2001).
83
See, e.g., Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 126–27 (2009); Yarborough v.
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8–11 (2003) (per curiam); Moody v. United States, 958 F.3d 485,
492 (6th Cir. 2020); Mejia v. Davis, 906 F.3d 307, 316 (5th Cir. 2018); Scott v. United
States, 890 F.3d 1239, 1258–59 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Carthorne, 878 F.3d
458, 466 (4th Cir. 2017); Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2011);
Cvijetinovic v. Eberlin, 617 F.3d 833, 838–39, 838 n.6 (6th Cir. 2010); Gordon v. United
States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687–91 (1984).
84
See, e.g., Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000); Ledford v. Warden, Ga.
Diagnostic Prison, 975 F.3d 1145, 1163 (11th Cir. 2020); Richardson v. Lemke, 745
F.3d 258, 272 (7th Cir. 2014).
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was caused by postconviction counsel failing to raise the claim at the
first opportunity (rather than, say, by their failure to pursue it on appeal
of a postconviction proceeding).85 Finally, as the foregoing perhaps
suggests, “cause” issues involving ineffective assistance of counsel pose
some of the greatest complexities and litigation challenges within the
procedural default space, especially for pro se petitioners.86
Plain error is much fairer and less problematic. In contrast to
cause and prejudice, plain error focuses directly on the strength of the
petitioner’s claim, meaning that the merits of every defaulted issue
would receive at least some level of scrutiny and consideration.87
Furthermore, while plain error is not an easy standard to meet, it
should be relatively easy to navigate and argue, even for pro se
petitioners. That is because all petitioners are already necessarily
arguing the merits of their claims, typically including some form of

85

See, e.g., Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2065–66 (2017); Hartman v. Payne, 8
F.4th 733, 736–37 (8th Cir. 2021); Crutchfield v. Dennison, 910 F.3d 968, 976–78 (7th
Cir. 2018); Lee v. Corsini, 777 F.3d 46, 61 (1st Cir. 2015); Fairchild v. Trammell, 784
F.3d 702, 723 (10th Cir. 2015); West v. Carpenter, 790 F.3d 693, 698 (6th Cir. 2015).
86
Cf., e.g., Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 432–33 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (expressing concern that the Supreme Court’s decision to allow ineffective
assistance of postconviction counsel to serve as cause “whenever the ‘state procedural
framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical
case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity’ to raise his claim on direct
appeal” would lead to “endless” questions and “state-by-state litigation . . . to work
them out” (citation omitted)); Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2012) (“Without
the help of an adequate attorney, a prisoner will have similar difficulties vindicating a
substantial ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Claims of ineffective assistance
at trial often require investigative work and an understanding of trial strategy. When
the issue cannot be raised on direct review, moreover, a prisoner asserting an
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in an initial-review collateral proceeding
cannot rely on a court opinion or the prior work of an attorney addressing that
claim. . . . While confined to prison, the prisoner is in no position to develop the
evidentiary basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often turns on evidence
outside the trial record.”); Edwards, 529 U.S. at 454–58 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(lamenting the extraordinary complexity—for “lawyers, let alone unrepresented state
prisoners”—generated by the rule that ineffective assistance can only serve as cause if
the ineffective assistance claim itself is not defaulted); Richardson v. Superintendent
Coal Twp. SCI, 905 F.3d 750, 760 (3d Cir. 2018) (describing the layers of procedural
default inquiries in the ineffective assistance context as a “labyrinth”).
87
As noted above, the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation” element can at
times implicate non-merits considerations. See supra note 71; see also infra Part IV.C.
But again, the element’s primary focus is on the merits—and the merits would still be
considered—given that the inquiry is holistic and the core question is whether
allowing an error to stand would be fair or just. See supra note 71.
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prejudice,88 and the types of errors plain error encompasses are those
that petitioners should be most equipped to uncover and challenge:
ones “so ‘plain’ the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in
countenancing [them], even absent the defendant’s timely assistance
in detecting [them].”89 In other words, petitioners would have few
labyrinths to explore or extraneous issues to investigate and litigate;
they would just have to show how their conviction was infected by
serious, obvious, and unfair errors. Finally, and perhaps most critically,
adopting plain error as the standard for procedural default would
ensure that federal courts are empowered and encouraged to correct
plain and significant constitutional violations that undermine the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings—
precisely what habeas corpus is supposed to address.90
Second, adopting plain error for procedural default would better
respect the principles of federalism and of honoring the finality of
criminal judgments that are central to habeas doctrine—and that often
counsel against granting habeas relief.91 Those principles drove the
Frady and Engle decisions and their expressed goal of imposing a more
demanding standard on collateral review than on direct review.92 Yet
as we have already seen, cause and prejudice cannot be said to be more
stringent than plain error—the standard on direct review—and is in
many ways less stringent. Thus, cause and prejudice serves the
principles of federalism and finality quite poorly, and plain error
would do so better simply by virtue of requiring more than the existing
rule.
Additionally, there is no reason why the plain error doctrine
would have to be as “forgiving” on habeas as on direct review. As
88
See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (“Habeas petitioners may
obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas
relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual
prejudice.’”); Daniels v. United States, 939 F.3d 898, 903 n.3 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting
that several circuits have applied Brecht to 2255 cases); see also supra notes 62–67 and
accompanying text.
89
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982); accord, e.g., United States v.
Chaparro, 956 F.3d 462, 484 (7th Cir. 2020). In line with that, petitioners should be
relatively prepared to argue why granting relief would promote fairness and justice,
even if some of that inquiry permits consideration of non-merits issues on occasion.
See supra notes 71, 87.
90
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
91
See, e.g., Ryan v. Gonzales, 568 U.S. 57, 76 (2013); Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9; Johnson
v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 309 (2005); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 490–91
(1991); Frady, 456 U.S. at 166.
92
See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134–35 (1982); Frady, 456 U.S. at 164–66, 175.
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discussed above, courts have applied plain error to a range of contexts
outside of direct appeal in criminal litigation. And when they do that,
they regularly make clear that the plain error test is not rigid, but
rather can and must be contoured to the circumstances at hand. For
example, courts routinely emphasize that plain error review in civil
proceedings is more exacting than in criminal ones.93 A similar
approach could certainly be taken in habeas proceedings to ensure
that plain error in the procedural default context would fully align with
Frady and Engle’s federalism and finality-grounded conclusion that “to
obtain collateral relief a prisoner must clear a significantly higher
hurdle than would exist on direct appeal.”94
Third, replacing cause and prejudice with plain error would serve
the interests of efficiency and judicial economy, which are likewise key
to the procedural default doctrine as well as habeas more generally.95
93
See, e.g., Trs. of Electricians’ Salary Deferral Plan v. Wright, 688 F.3d 922, 926
(8th Cir. 2012); Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 786 (7th Cir. 2020); C.B. v. City of
Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1016–18 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); United States v. Sum of
$185,336.07 U.S. Currency, 731 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2013); Richison v. Ernest Grp.,
Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J.); Ledford v. Peeples, 657 F.3d
1222, 1258 (11th Cir. 2011); Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 602 F.3d 431,
437 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Gaydar v. Sociedad Instituto Gineco-Quirurgico y Planificacion,
345 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2003); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 51 advisory committee’s note to 2003
amendment (“Although the language [of plain error used in Rule 51] is the same [as
in criminal cases], the context of civil litigation often differs from the context of
criminal prosecution; actual application of the plain-error standard takes account of
the differences.”).
94
Frady, 456 U.S. at 166; see also Engle, 456 U.S. at 134–35. The Supreme Court
presumably could have reached a similar conclusion in Frady and Engle based on
prevailing case law at the time. Cf., e.g., Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d
445, 456 (2d Cir. 1982) (“We have recognized that the plain error doctrine, especially
in civil cases, should be applied only where the ‘error (is) so serious and flagrant that
it goes to the very integrity of the trial.’” (citation omitted)); Gay v. P. K. Lindsay Co.,
666 F.2d 710, 712 n.1 (1st Cir. 1981) (“Plain error . . . is a rare species in civil litigation;
it will be found only ‘to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice.’” (citations omitted));
Wright v. Farmers Co-Op of Ark. & Okla., 620 F.2d 694, 699 (8th Cir. 1980) (“[I]n this
circuit, the plain error exception to compliance with Rule 51 is narrow and ‘confined
to the exceptional case where the error has seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” (citations omitted)); Liner v. J. B. Talley &
Co., 618 F.2d 327, 329–30 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (similar). Why it did not do
so and instead reasoned as if the only possible manifestation of plain error was the one
that applied on direct review of criminal cases is puzzling. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 134–
35; Frady, 456 U.S. at 164–66. But that puzzle need not be solved here, since it is clear
from the foregoing discussion that plain error could be adopted without running afoul
of the Court’s concerns.
95
See, e.g., United States v. Castro, 30 F.4th 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Day v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205–06 (2006).
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As indicated above, cause and prejudice can frequently raise a host of
challenging non-merits questions. For example, it can require courts
to resolve issues such as whether a particular jurisdiction’s procedures
offer a meaningful opportunity to raise ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims on direct review, what precise behavior constitutes
“interference” with a petitioner’s ability to raise a claim, whether the
basis for a petitioner’s challenge was sufficiently available at the time
of a default, how to approach multi-layered procedural default
inquiries, and whether a petitioner’s lawyer—at various stages of
litigation—provided deficient performance.96
Such questions,
moreover, often prove more difficult and time-consuming to resolve
than the merits themselves, as jurists and commentators regularly
emphasize.97 Furthermore, courts are encouraged to resolve default

96

See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 847 F.3d 502, 509–10 (7th Cir. 2017); Johnson v. Foster,
786 F.3d 501, 506–07 (7th Cir. 2015); Ambrose v. Booker, 684 F.3d 638, 645–49 (6th
Cir. 2012); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 895–98 (11th Cir. 2003); see also
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
97
See, e.g., Yick Man Mui v. United States, 614 F.3d 50, 56–57 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“Deciding whether a[n] [ineffective assistance] claim could have been raised and
decided on the record on direct appeal injects another issue to be litigated. Resolving
that issue may be difficult and may result in great delays caused by appeals and
remands. . . . Simply reaching the merits of such a claim rather than first considering
the failure to raise it on direct appeal is likely to further both efficiency and finality
and avoid miscarriages of justice.”); Carpenter v. Edwards, 113 F. App’x 672, 679–80
(6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt, J., concurring) (“As Justices Breyer and Stevens observed, the
forfeiture rules are no longer ‘comprehensible’ but rather have become ‘difficult
puzzles’ that foreclose a rational and efficient procedure for deciding habeas cases.
Time-wise and justice-wise, we would be much better off if we could just get to the
merits, as in the days of Fay v. Noia.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Galloway, 56
F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“[I]f procedural bar is raised as a defense,
it embroils us in nonmerits issues which are as time consuming as if we went straight
to the merits, and infinitely less productive. Applying, as we must, the cause and
prejudice standard for avoiding the procedural default, we must first examine all the
reasons advanced as cause, and write on the subtext after revisiting everything that
happened on direct appeal, and then some.”); Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500,
503 n.5 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[W]here the existence of the default or its justification
under Coleman’s cause and prejudice test is not clear from the record, it may be an
inefficient use of resources to engage in a sua sponte search for a state procedural
default. See Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1982) (‘These questions,
when raised in the district court, are almost always more complicated and time
consuming than are the merits of the petitioner’s federal claim.’).” (citation
omitted)); McKinnon v. Lockhart, 921 F.2d 830, 833 n. 7 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)
(“In cases such as this, it might well be easier and more efficient to reach the merits
than to go through the studied process required by the procedural default doctrine.
Recent commentary points up the problems with the cause and prejudice standard:
‘[T]he decision tree for habeas review of defaulted claims is intricate and costly. . . . In
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questions before reaching the merits,98 and although courts are
permitted to go directly to the merits where they clearly provide an
easier ground for denying relief,99 the merits are generally subject to
de novo review when cause and prejudice are assumed so as to bypass
the default analysis.100 In other words, under cause and prejudice,
courts may well be stuck conducting a complex procedural default
analysis that is ultimately more difficult than the merits questions, and
even if they can bypass the default issues, they must then approach the
merits under a standard of review that does little to streamline their
analysis. Finally, in cases where relief is warranted despite a default,
courts will have to address both the potentially complex default issues
and the merits under a searching standard of review, and because the
cause element is analytically distinct from the merits, many of the
default issues will provide limited insights into how the merits should
be resolved.
Under the plain error standard, however, things would be much
more straightforward. Instead of presenting courts with tough
questions that often need to be resolved before the merits issues, and
essence, Sykes and Strickland require habeas lawyers and federal judges and magistrates
to work through the equivalent of a law school exam every time a defendant tries to
escape procedural default.’ . . . In Johnson v. Dugger, it took forty pages and eighty
footnotes, nearly all spent on procedural default issues, for the majority to decide that
a remand is necessary to develop more facts concerning issues raised by the procedural
default doctrine. Likewise, in the case before us, delay occurred when the district
court remanded the case to the magistrate to make findings and recommendations on
whether McKinnon had demonstrated cause for his default. With all due respect for
the Sykes standard and the policies it is designed to serve, the magistrate and this court
could likely have disposed of the merits of McKinnon’s claims with little effort.”
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)); Buckley v. Lockhart, 892 F.2d 715, 725
(8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (“The courts and the petitioners all would
benefit if state courts would reach the merits of these claims. Much time could have
been saved had this case been disposed of on the merits at an earlier stage.”); Wilkes,
supra note 70, at 461 (“[H]abeas procedural default rules frequently result ‘in
unnecessarily time-consuming and complex review of purely procedural issues’ when
‘[i]t would often be far quicker and far fairer . . . simply to decide the constitutional
issues being presented.’” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
98
See, e.g., Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524–25 (1997); Lynch v. Ficco, 438
F.3d 35, 46 n.10 (1st Cir. 2006).
99
See, e.g., Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 524–25; Woods v. Lamas, 631 F. App’x 96, 99 n.4
(3d Cir. 2015); Jewett v. Brady, 634 F.3d 67, 77 (1st Cir. 2011); Dodge v. Robinson, 625
F.3d 1014, 1017 n.1 (8th Cir. 2010); Mahdi v. Bagley, 522 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2008).
100
See, e.g., Allen v. Benedetti, 629 F. App’x 814, 815 (9th Cir. 2015); Westberg v.
Palmer, 489 F. App’x 883, 887–88 (6th Cir. 2012); Hayes v. Blades, No. 1:11–cv–00502–
EJL, 2015 WL 3514385, at *18 (D. Idaho June 4, 2015); supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
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which may be both more challenging than and unrelated to those
issues, plain error would lead courts to address the merits immediately.
Furthermore, instead of requiring courts to evaluate the merits (when
they do so) effectively de novo, plain error would amplify the review
standard and thereby simplify the merits analysis. Indeed, because
plain error requires errors to be “plain,” the merits issues would almost
always be fairly easy to decide—since novel, complex, or intricate
questions would generally fail to meet that requirement.101 In
addition, plain error would simplify the analysis regardless of whether
relief is warranted; the stringent requirements of plain error would
frequently provide straightforward bases for denying relief, but it also
should often be fairly apparent when errors are severe and obvious
enough to meet those requirements.102 Thus, a plain error standard
for procedural default would do much to optimize efficiency and
judicial economy.103
101

See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 668 F. App’x 625, 626 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (observing that an error is not plain where “the questions and relevant
analytical framework are both complex and unanswered”); United States v. NarezGarcia, 819 F.3d 146, 151–52 (5th Cir. 2016) (“An error is not plain under current law
‘if a defendant’s theory requires the extension of precedent.’” (citation omitted));
United States v. Aslan, 644 F.3d 526, 547 (7th Cir. 2011) (“With the law unsettled, the
error cannot be plain.”); United States v. Hurt, 527 F.3d 1347, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(“Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has spoken to the issue . . . so Hurt cannot
prevail.”).
102
Cf. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982) (“Rule 52(b) was intended
to afford a means for the prompt redress of miscarriages of justice. By its terms,
recourse may be had to the Rule only on appeal from a trial infected with error so
‘plain’ the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent
the defendant’s timely assistance in detecting it.”).
103
Of course, there are some cases where an analysis of cause and prejudice could
easily resolve a case. However, where the prejudice requirement supplies an easy
ground for decision, so too would plain error, given that it likewise demands a showing
of prejudice. Similarly, where “cause” supplies the straightforward ground, most of
the time plain error would offer simple grounds as well, just different ones (e.g., the
plainness requirement). Finally, to the extent cause would provide an easy ground for
denying relief but plain error would not, it would seem that: (1) plain error would
nevertheless simplify the process of granting relief, see supra note 102 and
accompanying text; and (2) denying relief would raise serious fairness concerns, which
should ultimately trump efficiency concerns, see supra notes 74–90 and accompanying
text; cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 115–16 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“Ultimately, all of these limitations on the finality of criminal convictions emerge
from the tension between justice and efficiency in a judicial system that hopes to
remain true to its principles and ideals. Reasonable people may disagree on how best
to resolve these tensions. But the solution that today’s decision risks embracing seems
to me the most unfair of all: the denial of any judicial consideration of the
constitutional claims of a criminal defendant because of errors made by his attorney
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Finally, plain error would do more than cause and prejudice to
deter strategic behavior such as “sandbagging,” to encourage problems
to be brought to the court’s attention early on, and to ensure that the
trial is the “‘main event,’ . . . rather than a ‘tryout on the road’ for what
will later be the determinative federal habeas hearing.”104 Concerns
over such issues animate the cause and prejudice standard.105 But that
standard only imperfectly addresses those concerns.106
That is primarily because of the standard of review applicable to
defaulted claims and how it relates to the standard for many nondefaulted claims. As noted above, if a petitioner can satisfy cause and
prejudice for a defaulted claim, that claim is generally subject to
plenary review by a habeas court. In stark contrast, claims that were
previously adjudicated on the merits—and hence not defaulted—face
serious limits on review. With respect to 2254 claims, they are subject
to the extremely deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which
prohibits federal habeas relief unless the state court’s resolution of the
claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.107
And in 2255 proceedings, previously adjudicated claims cannot be
reviewed at all except for in narrow circumstances, such as (at a

which lie outside the power of the habeas petitioner to prevent or deter and for which,
under no view of morality or ethics, can he be held responsible.”).
104
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89–90.
105
See, e.g., McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491–93 (1991); Frady, 456 U.S. at 165–
66; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89–90; Lee Kovarsky, Delay in the Shadow of Death, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1319, 1329–31 (2020); Sean L. Dalton, Carved in Sand: Actual Innocence in United States
v. Maybeck, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2388, 2406 n.146 (1995).
106
This discussion assumes—for sake of arguing in line with the principles currently
influencing habeas doctrine—that such concerns are valid. That is, however, a
questionable assumption. See, e.g., Sykes, 433 U.S. at 103 & n.5 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329,
357 n.193 (2010); Gavin R. Tisdale, Note, A New Look at Constitutional Errors in Criminal
Trials, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1665, 1687 (2016).
107
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); cf. Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 301–02 (2013)
(indicating that claims that are not subject to this standard will be procedurally
defaulted).
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minimum) “an intervening change of controlling law,” “new
evidence,” or “a clear error or . . . manifest injustice.”108
All of that, in turn, could create incentives for petitioners to, in
various ways, avoid presenting claims on direct review. For example, a
petitioner who believes that a federal habeas court might be more
open to granting relief than other courts could prefer to seek de novo
review—by defaulting a claim and arguing cause and prejudice—
rather than presenting their claim earlier and facing 2254(d) or 2255’s
limitations on relitigation.109 Or relatedly, a habeas petitioner might
simply feel less pressure to uncover every possible claim while direct
review or state habeas proceedings are ongoing and instead feel
encouraged to scour the record after the fact for claims that could
potentially surmount the cause and prejudice hurdle.
Adopting plain error for procedural default would substantially
reduce any incentive not to present claims during pre-federal habeas
proceedings. As explained above, unlike cause and prejudice, plain

108

United States v. Becker, 502 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Davis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 333, 342 (1974); Stoufflet v. United States, 757 F.3d 1236, 1238–43
(11th Cir. 2014); White v. United States, 371 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir. 2004). That rule
may even apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims—which can be raised for the
first time in a 2255 proceeding without facing a procedural default barrier, see Massaro
v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503–04 (2003)—where the basis for the ineffectiveness claim
has already been resolved, see Yick Man Mui v. United States, 614 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir.
2010) (“[S]trategies, actions, or inactions of counsel that gave rise to an ineffective
assistance claim adjudicated on the merits on direct appeal may not be the basis for
another ineffective assistance claim in a Section 2255 proceeding.”).
109
This is substantially more likely in the 2254 context, given that the “earlier
courts” in that context are ones of an entirely different system; many state court judges
are elected and hence “may have difficulty resisting popular pressures not experienced
by federal judges,” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 525 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
see also Norman L. Greene, Reflections on the Appointment and Election of State Court Judges:
A Response to Adumbrations on Judicial Campaign Speech and a Model for a Response to Similar
Advocacy Articles, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 601, 621–22 (2007); and 2255 motions are usually
adjudicated by the original district judge, see RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS R. 4(a) [hereinafter “2255 R.”].
But a 2255 petitioner might still want to hold an argument in reserve rather than put
all their eggs in the direct review basket. For instance, they could believe there is a
chance of a new district judge in a 2255 proceeding, see 2255 R. 4(a) (“If the
appropriate judge is not available, the clerk must forward the motion to a judge under
the court’s assignment procedure.”), or a new appellate panel, see Appellate Courts and
Cases – Journalist’s Guide, USCOURTS.GOV, https://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/appellate-courts-and-cases-journalists-guide (last visited Oct. 29, 2022)
(“Appeals normally are decided by randomly assigned three-judge panels.” (emphasis
added)), and they could therefore wish to retain arguments for 2255 review in case a
new constellation of judges happens to be more amenable to granting relief.
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error raises the standard of review for defaulted, prejudicial claims
regardless of the reason for the default. And the standard plain error
imposes is comparable to the standards currently applicable to
previously adjudicated claims. Specifically, it is similar to 2254(d) in
that both are difficult to meet and require errors beyond the possibility
of reasonable disagreement.110 It is also directly analogous to the clear
error/manifest injustice exception to the 2255 relitigation bar.111
Thus, the standard of review would be similar on habeas for both
defaulted and non-defaulted claims, and there would be much less
reason for a petitioner not to raise all their claims prior to habeas
review.
In sum, not only is plain error more appropriate than cause and
prejudice for procedural default based on the fundamental rationale
the Supreme Court employed to adopt the latter over the former, but
also plain error better aligns with the core principles the Court has
designated as central to habeas and procedural default. Thus, it is time
for Frady and Engle to be reconsidered and for plain error to replace
cause and prejudice.112
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Compare Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (explaining that for
an error to be “plain,” “the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute,” as well as that “[m]eeting all [the requirements of plain error] is
difficult, ‘as it should be’” (citation omitted)), with Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
102–03 (2011) (“If [2254(d)] is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to
be. . . . As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state
prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in
federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood
and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.”).
111
See Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that
“manifest injustice” and “plain error” are equivalent and more stringent than “clear
error”); United States v. Clayton, 210 F.3d 841, 843 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Because Clayton
raises this argument for the first time on appeal, we review it for plain error only. We
will not reverse on this basis absent a clear error resulting in manifest injustice.”
(citations omitted)); Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1120 (10th Cir. 2005)
(“Both the [Supreme] Court and this circuit have frequently described the . . . plain
error standard as shorthand for or synonymous with an ‘interests of justice,’
‘miscarriage of injustice,’ or ‘manifest injustice’ exception to a litigant’s failure to
object in the trial court.”); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1425
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“[M]ost cases, pre- and post-Olano, in our circuit and others,
use the term ‘manifest injustice’ to describe the result of a plain error. And, other
cases seem to have equated plain error with manifest injustice.”).
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At least until a better standard is devised. See supra note 12.
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IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Although hopefully the foregoing discussion has convinced
readers of the plainly erroneous nature of cause and prejudice, there
certainly may be objections to my analysis. Accordingly, this Part
addresses a series of potential counterarguments, including that
adopting plain error for procedural default: (A) might be unfair in
some cases; (B) would leave no distinction between defaulted and
forfeited claims; (C) would create a procedural default standard
similar to, but less demanding than, AEDPA deference; or (D) would
generate confusion. None of these assertions, however, ultimately
undermines this Article’s position.
A. Plain Error Would Be Unfair in Some Cases
The first possible counterargument to rethinking Frady and
Engle’s choice of cause and prejudice over plain error is that applying
plain error across the board could generate significant unfairness in
certain cases. For instance, where new evidence has come to light,
there very well might be cause for failing to raise a prejudicial issue and
yet no error that was “plain.” Thus, perhaps we should leave
procedural default doctrine as is.
That counterargument is not without force, and too strict a
procedural default rule could certainly be unfair. But as noted above,
forfeiture doctrine—which is generally the trigger for plain error
review—can take into account the reason for the failure to raise an
argument.113 Indeed, courts regularly treat claims that could not have
been raised at an earlier point as preserved.114 And a similar principle
is applicable to procedural default.115 Accordingly, and given that

113

See supra note 73.
See, e.g., United States v. Doby, 928 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2019); United
States v. Rivas-Estrada, 906 F.3d 346, 348–49 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Ramirez,
714 F.3d 1134, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Hunter, 809 F.3d 677, 682
(D.C. Cir. 2016); United States v. Jackson, 658 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2011); United
States v. Johnson, 756 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); United States v.
Battles, 745 F.3d 436, 446–47 (10th Cir. 2014); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b) (“If a party
does not have an opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection
does not later prejudice that party.”).
115
See supra note 73. But cf. United States v. Chalan, 438 F. App’x 710, 712 (10th
Cir. 2011) (“Our circuit has not explicitly considered the interaction between Murray
and Bousley. The former holds that a petitioner can show cause when the [sic] ‘the
factual . . . basis for a claim was not reasonably available’ at the time of direct appeal.
This statement suggests the cause and prejudice inquiry applies to such claims. But if
the factual predicate for a claim is not available, it would appear to qualify under
114
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procedural default is an equitable and discretionary doctrine,116 it
could be formulated so as to treat claims that were truly unavailable at
an earlier point as non-defaulted (or exempted from the standard
default rule), even while broadly applying plain error as an excuse to
default.
Of course, that approach would to some degree re-inject a “cause”
element into procedural default, which, in turn, raises the question of
whether it would simply return us to where we started, nullifying the
above analysis.117
The answer, however, is no. To start, given procedural default’s
flexibility, there is no reason why such a cause element could not be
contoured narrowly—applicable to only a small set of cases—such that
the reason for failing to raise a claim could only be invoked or
considered in rare circumstances. Hence, a cause “exemption” would
not swallow the generally applicable plain error rule or undermine its
benefits. Rather, it would simply avoid unfairness in cases where
applying plain error does not make sense.
Alternatively, even if plain error were effectively applied across the
board, the doctrine could be adjusted so as to avoid much of the
potential unfairness, again given the malleable nature of procedural
default, as well as plain error itself.118 For example, although plain
error typically applies to actions that were erroneous at the time they
were taken, the Supreme Court has concluded that an error will be
viewed as “plain” even if it did not become obvious until the time of
appellate review.119 A similar rule could be adopted in the procedural
default context. Courts could say, for instance, that a previously
undiscoverable claim satisfies the “plainness” prong so long as it would
have been plain error to deny the claim if it had been raised earlier.
In short, we should not avoid rethinking Frady and Engle based on
the risk of unfairness in certain cases. There are several ways to
Bousley as a ‘claim[ ] that could not be presented without further factual
development.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
116
See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (“The procedural-default
rule is neither a statutory nor a constitutional requirement, but it is a doctrine adhered
to by the courts to conserve judicial resources and to respect the law’s important
interest in the finality of judgments.”); Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 (2004) (“The
procedural default doctrine . . . ‘refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable
principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and
judicial decisions.’” (citation omitted)).
117
See supra Part III.
118
See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
119
See Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 271–79 (2013).
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manage that possibility, and plain error is broadly a preferable rule to
cause and prejudice.
B. The Same Standard Would Apply to Defaulted and Forfeited Claims
A second possible counterargument is that we should not replace
cause and prejudice because then there would be no difference
between the standards applied to procedurally defaulted claims and
non-defaulted claims that are merely forfeited (i.e., non-defaulted
claims that are raised for the first time in federal habeas proceedings
on appeal).
This is a version of the argument advanced by the Frady Court that
plain error was designed for direct review.120 But as noted above, plain
error need not be applied with the same level of stringency in every
context.121 Consequently, plain error could certainly accommodate
any perceived need to be more forgiving towards forfeited claims than
defaulted ones.
Moreover, the plain error inquiry in the procedural default
context would necessarily differ from the habeas appeal context. For
the former, the analysis would focus on decisions made by courts
during the pre-federal habeas proceedings; for the latter, it would
focus on decisions made by the district court in resolving the habeas
petition. While there might be some overlap, the inquiries would still
be quite distinct and would largely examine different things.
Accordingly, petitioners would still need to take care to raise
arguments and objections before the district court, even if they could
overcome a default.
C. Plain Error Is Similar to, but Less Demanding than, AEDPA
Deference
A third objection, similar to the second, is that plain error would
be less demanding than AEDPA deference. As noted above, under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), habeas relief cannot be granted for claims
previously decided on the merits in state court unless they run afoul of
“clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
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Cf. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164, 166 n.15 (1982) (explaining that
plain error should not be used for procedural default “[b]ecause it was intended for
use on direct appeal,” but noting that “[w]e of course do not hold that the ‘plain error’
standard cannot be applied by a court of appeals on direct review of a district court’s
conduct of the § 2255 hearing itself”).
121
See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
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of the United States.”122 Plain error, although likewise restricting relief
only to patent defects,123 does not require that an error be made
obvious by rulings of the Supreme Court.124 Thus, one might argue,
under a plain error procedural default rule, a petitioner could be
incentivized to default their claims and proceed under plain error
rather than face AEDPA’s more demanding limitations. And since
“cause” for a default is distinct from the merits and difficult to show,
cause and prejudice would discourage such behavior.
This argument is a cogent one, but it is ultimately unpersuasive.
First of all, as explained above, cause and prejudice is likely to
encourage strategic behavior because it permits de novo review so long
as there is good reason for failing to raise a prejudicial error.125 Plain
error, in contrast, always requires a heightened showing to obtain
relief, meaning that the potential benefit of defaulting under that
standard is much less. In essence, the only circumstance in which
defaulting might be strategically beneficial under a plain error
standard would be where an error is not plain under the decisions of
the Supreme Court, but is under the decisions of some other court.
Furthermore, plain error directs courts to correct an error only if
it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. That requirement provides courts with considerable
decisional latitude,126 and it would certainly permit them to consider
the possibility of strategic or dilatory behavior in deciding how to
resolve a claim. Indeed, as the Second Circuit has explained:
What must also be weighed in the equation, however, is
whether the party seeking relief under the plain error rule
may have originally made a strategic decision not to object to
the conduct now challenged on appeal. Consideration of
122

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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Compare Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013) (per curiam) (making clear
that circuit precedent cannot render law “clearly established” for purposes of
§ 2254(d)(1)), with Henderson, 568 U.S. at 278 (demonstrating that an error can be
plain based on appellate decisions, not just Supreme Court rulings), and United States
v. Mathis, 554 F. App’x 856, 857 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“‘[T]he law of this
circuit [is] that . . . there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the
Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving’ the issue.” (alterations in original)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
125
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
126
See, e.g., United States v. Pérez-Rodríguez, 13 F.4th 1, 30 (1st Cir. 2021) (“Our
analysis under this final prong of plain error review is ‘flexible . . . and depends
significantly on the nature of the error, its context, and the facts of the case.’” (citation
omitted)); see also supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
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this “strategy” factor is implicit in Olano’s fourth
requirement—that the error seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. If a
defendant makes a knowing choice to abstain from objecting
to an alleged error, the probability that fairness would
require correcting that error is, of course, significantly
reduced.
. . . [T]he possibility of strategic behavior is important not
only in cases where the particular decision not to object to
an alleged error is itself manipulative; rather, it comes into
play whenever recognition of the error by a higher court
would encourage such actions by future litigants.127
Moreover, the contours of procedural default are subject to
significant judicial discretion, and plain error’s level of rigor can vary
with the circumstances.128 Thus, if deemed necessary, plain error
could be applied in 2254 cases so as to align with AEDPA. In other
words, in appropriate cases, the doctrine could perhaps be interpreted
so as to require that an error be “plain” according to decisions of the
Supreme Court.
In short, adopting plain error in the procedural default context
would not encourage tactical behavior or delay, and in any event, plain
error is capable of addressing any potential concerns regarding those
issues.129
D. Replacing Cause and Prejudice Would Create Confusion
The final counterargument is that replacing cause and prejudice
with plain error would generate confusion, as the legal system adjusts
to a new procedural default regime.
This objection is the weakest of the set. Again, cause and
prejudice is a profoundly challenging and labyrinthine doctrine, and
it is much more confusing to litigate and apply than plain error.130
Furthermore, because plain error has broad applicability outside the
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United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir. 2000); accord United States v.
Hill, 31 F.4th 1076, 1084–85 (8th Cir. 2022); United States v. Greenspan, 923 F.3d 138,
157–58 (3d Cir. 2019); United States v. Shwayder, 312 F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Williams, 64 F.3d 665, 1995 WL 478122, at *4 (7th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished table decision).
128
See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
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A party that engages in strategic withholding of arguments also risks waiver,
which can foreclose a finding of plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
733–34 (1993).
130
See supra notes 74–90, 95–103 and accompanying text.
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default context—including in habeas proceedings131—litigants and the
judiciary should already be comfortable with the rule and equipped to
apply it. Therefore, it is actually retaining cause and prejudice that
would generate the most confusion, and adopting plain error would
serve as an improvement.
V. CONCLUSION
It is time to reconsider Frady and Engle. Although their decision
to retain cause and prejudice over plain error for procedural default
may have made sense forty years ago, subsequent legal developments
have wholly undermined the basis for that choice. And plain error, in
its modern form, is a substantially more appropriate standard for
procedural default, vindicating much more effectively the principles
undergirding habeas and default doctrine. In short, there is little
reason to continue to abide by the choice made in those decisions,132
and it is time for cause and prejudice’s dominance over procedural
default to come to an end.
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See, e.g., United States v. Redd, 562 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2009).
Cf., e.g., Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1336 (2021) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“The traditional stare decisis factors include the quality of the precedent’s
reasoning, its consistency with other decisions, legal and factual developments since
the precedent was decided, and its workability.”).
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